Kimi K3接入Claude Code，平均任务成本是Kimi Code的9倍
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Claude Code Update Preview: The next version will allow child agents to perform tasks in the background by default.
BlockBeats reported on June 30th that Boris Cherny, creator of Claude Code, officially announced that the next version will default to background task execution for sub-agents. Users can discuss solutions with Claude while the background automatically completes code refactoring, testing, and PR submissions. If a sub-agent needs to run in the foreground, users only need to verbally inform the system. This feature is currently in limited beta testing. Previously, Claude Code had already launched Routines (cloud-based, allowing continuous work even with your computer closed) and Dynamic workflows (for scheduling dozens to hundreds of sub-agents to collaborate in parallel for complex tasks). This upgrade solidifies "background execution" as the default configuration, further lowering the barrier to entry. --------------------------------- Click the original link below to join the Beating · Lark AI news channel and monitor global AI hotspots and news 24/7.
Claude Code's real-time collaboration feature is available to individual users, while Pro and Max subscriptions can generate real-time web dashboards.
According to Beating, Anthropic announced that it will roll out the Live Artifacts feature of its terminal agent programming tool, Claude Code, to Pro and Max individual subscription accounts. Previously, this ability to convert command-line interactions into web dashboards in real time was only available to team and enterprise users. Now, individual developers can directly issue commands in the terminal when writing code or analyzing data using Claude Code, publishing session-generated data, prototypes, or architecture diagrams as independent web pages. The generated web pages will refresh in real time as the terminal task is executed. By sharing a private link, team members or customers can view the latest progress at any time without developers needing to repeatedly send screenshots or share terminal screens. Currently, these web pages are statically hosted, unable to send network requests to external networks from within the page, nor can they save form inputs or perform multi-route redirects. Users can use this feature after logging in to the terminal.
Claude Code can also be compromised? Accused of using strangers' passwords to modify databases across servers.
According to Beating's monitoring, a user submitted a report on GitHub stating that when using Anthropic's command-line AI assistant Claude Code, server IP addresses, usernames, and root passwords that did not belong to the user appeared out of thin air in the AI's dialogue context. Subsequently, the local AI assistant directly read these passwords, automatically connected to someone else's server via SSH, and performed write modifications to the database. In other words, the user's AI, using someone else's account and password, mistakenly connected to and modified someone else's production database. Community technical staff analyzed that the root cause of the problem may be the failure of the "prompt prefix caching" isolation mechanism of the large model. To reduce computational costs and speed up the process, the cloud-based large model caches the preceding text of user dialogues; if the cache keys between different users collide or become confused, someone else's confidential cache may be incorrectly concatenated into your dialogue. If this conjecture is true, any developer using Claude Code faces the risk of their server usernames, passwords, and core source code being obfuscated and leaked to other users. However, it cannot be ruled out that this is merely a case of the model's illusion coincidentally guessing the real IP address and weak password, or that local project history contaminated the context. This issue has been tagged with the security category (area:security) by GitHub's automated system, and all parties are awaiting official verification and conclusions.
Anthropic admitted that Claude Code had embedded steganography code targeting Chinese users, calling it an "abuse prevention experiment," and promised to roll back the code tomorrow.
According to Beating's monitoring, Thariq, an engineer on Anthropic's Claude Code team, publicly responded to the recent controversial "spy code" leak. He admitted that in March of this year, an experimental mechanism was embedded in the product. This mechanism detected whether the system timezone was Asia/Shanghai or Asia/Urumqi, whether the proxy hostname matched a list of Chinese resellers, and the keyword "AI Lab," and used special punctuation marks to inject hidden marker information into system prompts in a steganographic manner. He stated that the mechanism was intended to "prevent unauthorized resellers from abusing accounts and model distillation," but emphasized that the team has since implemented stronger protective measures and "has always intended to take it offline." The relevant PR has been merged, and it is expected to be completely rolled back in tomorrow's version release. This leak was made public on June 30 by the security account @IntCyberDigest, accompanied by two screenshots of code showing that Claude Code performed environmental fingerprinting on Chinese users without their knowledge. While Thariq's response was a direct admission, the timeline of "launching in March and only accelerating its withdrawal after being exposed" has still sparked widespread skepticism within the community. The comments section almost unanimously criticized Anthropic for "only announcing its withdrawal after being caught" and "secretly monitoring users without notifying them," severely damaging the company's long-standing image of "prioritizing security and ethics." --------------------------------- Click the original link below to join the Beating · Lark AI news channel for 24/7 monitoring of global AI hot topics and news.
Meta restricts employee use of Claude and Codex to prevent "model distillation" violations.
According to Beating's monitoring, Meta is strictly limiting its applied AI engineering team's use of Anthropic's Claude Code and OpenAI's Codex, and has even suspended some related tasks to strengthen compliance reviews. Meta is concerned that employees' over-reliance on external tools to develop internal alternatives could lead to the output of competing models seeping into its own training data. This "model distillation" practice could violate the terms of service of competing products and cause serious conflicts with partners. Currently, Meta only allows employees to use external AI for routine tasks such as setting up workflows, cleaning code, and building test infrastructure, and the output must be strictly reviewed by humans; however, it strictly prohibits the use of external models to generate programming challenges to evaluate its internal models, and also prohibits the use of external AI to find code vulnerabilities or devise test tasks. This move is also part of Meta's efforts to reshape its internal toolchain and control its multi-billion dollar internal AI operating costs by promoting its self-developed coding assistant MetaCode (formerly DevMate).
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued a risk warning regarding the potential security backdoors in the AI programming tool Claude Code.
According to Odaily Odaily, the Cybersecurity Threat and Vulnerability Information Sharing Platform (NVDB) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology recently discovered that the AI programming tool Claude Code has a security backdoor vulnerability, which poses a serious threat. Claude Code is an AI programming tool developed by Anthropic, an American company, which can autonomously complete code writing and repair tasks based on text requirements. Due to its built-in monitoring mechanism, it can send sensitive information such as user location and identity to remote servers without the user's consent. The affected Claude Code versions are 2.1.91 to 2.1.196. It is recommended that relevant units and users immediately conduct a comprehensive investigation. For development terminals that have installed the above-mentioned affected versions, they should immediately uninstall or upgrade to the latest secure version that has removed the relevant backdoor code. Strengthen the control of external access permissions and traffic monitoring of development tools within the core business network segment to prevent the unauthorized transmission of sensitive data.